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Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the
Resources of Appellate Review
Edward H. Cooper*
I. Introduction
My text is a single and rather simple sentence from Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses.
My theme is equally simple.. Rule 52(a) serves a vital institutional
role in allocating the responsibility and the power of decision between
district courts and the courts of appeals. The "dearly erroneous" stan-
dard of appellate review established by the Rule is a fine example of the
rule-making process working at its best. The Rule has been enormously
successful. Professor Wright believes that no provision of the Civil Rules
has been quoted and cited more often than this one.1 This success is due
to the fact that the "clearly erroneous" phrase has no intrinsic meaning.
It is elastic, capacious, malleable, and above all variable. Because it
means nothing, it can mean anything and everything that it ought to
mean. It cannot be defined, unless the definition might enumerate a
nearly infinite number of shadings along the spectrum of working review
standards. Learned Hand recognized early on that "[ilt is idle to try to
define the meaning of the phrase .... ,,2 Much more recently, the
Supreme Court has noted that "the meaning of the phrase 'dearly erro-
neous' is not immediately apparent. . .. "
The fact that definition is neither possible, nor-as I shall argue-
desirable, naturally has not quenched the eternal ardor of judges who
seek to substitute longer phrases, also intrinsically meaningless, for the
elusive phrase of the authoritative text. The most famous effort was
made by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.: "A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support
* Associate Dean and Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
A.B., 1961, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1964, Harvard Law School. The author thanks his colleague
Kent R. Syverud for reading and improving this article.
1 C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 96, at 647 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Wright con-
tinues this passage by observing: "The rule is usually cited tojustify refusal to interfere with the fact
findings made in the trial court." Id.
* 2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d. Cir. 1945). Judge Hand
continued: "[A]II that can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate less to
reverse the finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless
reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded." Id.
3 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
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it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." '4
The Court also has suggested that findings cannot be reversed if
they are "plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," and that
there "can virtually never be clear error" if the finding rests on a "deci-
sion to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of
whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contra-
dicted by extrinsic evidence. . . .5
No apparent harm has been done by these attempts at definition,
because they have not impaired the vagrant variability of the Rule.
Courts by and large have been astute to make the Rule mean whatever it
should mean in the circumstances presented for appellate decision. Dif-
ferent kinds of fact-finding chores give rise to more or less penetrating
review according to the relative capacities of district courts and appellate
courts in many dimensions, the need for uniformity between cases, the
perceived importance of the dispute, and the nature of the legal rules
involved. Different kinds of law-applying chores are followed by more or
less penetrating review according to these same factors. Over time, all of
these factors change; the actual measure of review appropriate for a case
decided in 1988 may be different from the measure appropriate in 1958
or 1938.
The variability of the "clearly erroneous" phrase is not limited to the
setting of court of appeals review of district court findings in civil litiga-
tion. The success of the phrase has caused it to be used in many other
settings. In each setting the actual level of appellate scrutiny should be
adjusted to the institutional roles involved. As one example, Civil Rule
72(a) provides that orders of magistrates acting on nondispositive pre-
trial matters shall be set aside if "clearly erroneous," and the Advisory
Committee Notes to Civil Rule 74 assert correctly that the clearly errone-
ous standard is appropriate if the parties have agreed that appeal from a
magistrate exercising civil trial jurisdiction shall be taken to the district
court. There is little reason to suppose that the district courts acting in
these settings should act in exactly the same way as courts of appeals
reviewing district court findings. Magistrates are different from district
judges, who in turn are different from appellate judges. If the hopes held
out for district court appeal prove true, the process will be quicker and
less expensive than appeal to a court of appeals. The consequences of
reversal may easily be less costly, leading to quicker and more effective
correction than follows reversal of a district court by a court of appeals. 6
Surely these factors should affect the working standard of review.
My elaboration of this simple theme breaks down into three compo-
nents. First is a brief summary of the familiar history of the Rule,
designed to suggest that those who framed it knew full well that it would
prove as adaptable as in fact it has been. Second is a review of the insti-
4 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
5 Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75.
6 The allocation of review of magistrate trial decisions between district courts and courts of
appeal is explored in 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3901.1 (Supp. 1988).
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tutional factors, the comparative competencies of district courts and ap-
pellate courts, that shape review of questions of fact. Many of these
factors, but not all, are reflected in the 1985 amendment that brought
into the explicit text of the Rule the not quite universally recognized
proposition that the clearly erroneous standard applies to findings based
on documentary evidence.7 Review of fact inferences drawn from undis-
puted factual predicates thus will occupy center stage of this part. Finally
comes an exploration of the problems of law application. Appellate re-
view of district court law application has given rise to many of the most
disputed and interesting questions of clear error review. This part ac-
cordingly accounts for the bulk of my remarks.
II. A Summary History
The background of Rule 52(a) is well known." A brief summary of
the familiar story is helpful, however, as a reminder of the checkered his-
tory of appellate review of judge-found facts, and as a more important
reminder of the flexibility that was deliberately built into the Rule.
The FirstJudiciary Act provided for review both at law and in equity
by writ of error, essentially foreclosing review of facts found by a judge
sitting in equity. Review by appeal was restored to equity practice in
1803. 9 An 1865 statute provided that the parties to an action at law
could waive the right to jury trial, and that fact findings of a judge would
"have the same effect as the verdict of a jury."10 Eventually equity re-
vived the practice, briefly introduced by the FirstJudiciary Act, of receiv-
ing oral testimony. Many court of appeals decisions came to announce
the rule that findings based on oral testimony would be reversed only if
dearly erroneous, even as the tradition of de novo review became con-
fused in other settings as well. By 1934, judge findings of fact were re-
viewed at law as if made by a special verdict of a jury, and were reviewed
in equity by an uncertain set of rules that depended in part on the role of
oral testimony.
Against this background, it was easily agreed that the new Rules
should adopt a standard of review of judge findings that did not depend
on the former distinctions between law and equity. The effort to unify
law and equity in one form of action would be seriously undermined if
7 The order transmitting the 1985 amendment of Rule 52 is set out at 105 F.R.D. 179, 202
(1985); for the text of the rule as amended see a at 204-05; for the note of the Advisory Committee
see id at 221-23.
8 Among the articles that provide useful information are Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Juy Cases,
20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 68 (1936); Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 129 (1936); Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 190 (1937);
Oliver, Appellate Fact Review Under Rule 52(a): An Analysis and Critique of Sixth Circuit Precedent, 16 U.
TOL. L. REv. 667 (1985); Warren, New Light on the Histoiy of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv.
L. REV. 49, 101-05 (1923); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
764-71 (1957); Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Undisputed
Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 508-16 (1963).
9 See Warren, supra note 8.
10 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501: "The finding of the court upon the facts,
which finding may be either general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict of ajury....
When the finding is special, the review may also extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the
facts found to support the judgment." Id.
RULE 5219881
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the standard of review depended on the historic division. Rule 68 of the
draft rules proposed that judge-made findings of fact should "have the
same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in equity." 11 This
draft prompted a vigorous debate over the question whether judge find-
ings should be accorded the weight given to jury findings at law, or in-
stead should be given some reduced measure of respect drawing from
the practice in equity. The result of this debate was a rule drafted in the
clearly erroneous terminology used on equity review of findings based on
oral testimony, accompanied by an Advisory Committee Note stating that
the clear error standard applies whether the finding of fact is made on
conflicting testimony or is "deduced or inferred from uncontradicted
testimony."' 2
It is commonly stated that rejection of the draft proposal to adopt
the standard of review applied in equity proceedings rested on uncer-
tainty as to the actual scope of equity review. It is more important that
the result was that judge findings were accorded less deference than jury
findings. It is still more important to recall that those who engaged in
the original rule-making debate understood that the standard of review,
however phrased, left room for accommodation to the needs of specific
decision. Clark-Professor, Dean, Reporter and Judge--observed dur-
ing the course of the debate that the actual standard of review would not
much depend on the words chosen to capture it:
There seems to be no hard and fast distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact; ... and since there are so many cases on the
border line between ultimate facts and conclusions of facts, i.e., law,
the way is open to a court with understanding to accomplish substan-
tial justice, whatever the formula. Messrs. Arnold andJames point out
that "the elasticity of these two escapes" of review of an error of law or
of an arbitrary finding without evidence to support it .... "is sufficient
togve the Court almost complete power to review if it wants to take
it. 13
The clear error rule that emerged from this process was more com-
plicated than the uncertain equity practice that it followed. The compli-
cation, however, arose from the increasingly diverse circumstances of
trial court decision and appellate review. The Rule was well drafted to
meet the need for flexible adaptation to those circumstances.
The only significant amendment of Rule 52(a) since 1938 was the
1985 addition of the reminder that the clear error standard applies to all
findings of fact, "whether based on oral or documentary evidence."' 4
Although this amendment did no more than force on all the circuits the
rule already recognized in most, the justifications for the amendment de-
serve patient restatement. The appellate practice confirmed by the
amendment goes to the very heart of the allocation of authority between
11 Draft Rule 68 is quoted in 9 C. WRIGrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 2571, at 682 n.14 (1971).
12 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 52 as originally promulgated is set out in 12 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 490-91 (1973).
13 Clark & Stone, supra note 8, at 211 n.93 (citations omitted).
14 See supra note 7.
[Vol. 63:645
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trial judges and appellate judges. A study of the reasons underlying this
practice advances understanding of the institutional realities recognized
by Rule 52.
III. The Institutional Setting - Fact Review
The dearly erroneous standard of review could mean many things.
In fact it does mean many things, and properly so. A vast array of institu-
tional factors affect the allocation of responsibility between trial judges
and appellate courts. These factors are not constants. To the contrary,
they change over time and at any moment vary from one case to another.
This part will explore some of the factors that bear on wise allocation of
the responsibility for finding the facts of individual cases. The next part
will explore some of the factors bearing on responsibility for law
application.
Examination of the allocation of responsibility between trial judges
and appellate courts must begin with the common assertion that the fed-
eral courts of appeals serve two functions: the correction of error in indi-
vidual cases and the development of the law in ways that will guide future
conduct and future litigation. 15 The proper balance between these func-
tions is not self-evident. Neither need it be fixed over time. Thus we can
find roughly contemporaneous complaints by a distinguished trial judge
and an outstanding circuit judge, one urging that the courts of appeals
are improperly increasing the scrutiny given trial court findings in an ef-
fort to improve the quality of justice in individual cases,' 6 and the other
arguing that the courts of appeals are improperly surrendering the obli-
gation to ensure justice in individual cases.' 7 The constantly increasing
numbers of appeals force continued reexamination of the balance be-
tween these functions. At the extreme, it is now occasionally proposed
that we should abandon the tradition that for a century has made one
appeal available as a matter of right.' 8 Short of that measure, it is com-
mon to worry about the balance between the factors that affect the pres-
ent structure of regional courts of appeals. Thus it is wondered how
many judges can function effectively as a single "court," what price is
paid for continuing the process of splitting regional circuits to reduce the
number of judges on any single court, whether a national court of ap-
peals is necessary to achieve national uniformity of federal law, whether
specialized courts of appeals could do the same job better, whether ap-
peal as of right should be limited to more localized tribunals much as the
15 E.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 2-3 (1976).
16 Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous
Rule" Being Avoided? 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409 (1981).
17 Judge Alvin B. Rubin, speaking at the 47th Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, May 20, 1986, observed in part: "The error-correction function of the Courts of
Appeal is largely vanishing. It is a matter of a lot of things: the amount of pressure, of caseload, and
I feel, out of the erroneous ruling of interpreting such cases as the Pullman Standard and the City of
Natchitoches. So that the emphasis now is on fact-finding in the district court and minimal error
correction in the Court of Appeals." 114 F.R.D. 419, 549 (1986).
18 The question whether there should be a right of appeal from a trial court to a first-level court
of appeals is thoughtfully explored in Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE LJ. 62 (1985).
1988] RULE 52
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parties now can agree to trial before a magistrate with appeal of right
only to the district court, and so on.19
The standard of review applied to judge findings of fact cannot es-
cape this debate over the role and structure of the courts of appeals. It
would be remarkable if the actual working standard of review were not
affected by the shifting functional ability of the courts of appeals to
devote attention to the wisdom of specific findings in particular cases. It
also would be undesirable to avoid such effects. One of the valuable at-
tributes of the clearly erroneous standard is that it can be adapted to the
changing roles to which the courts of appeals are drawn or driven.
However the standard of review may shift over time, the next most
obvious factor to consider is the comparison between review of judge
findings and jury verdicts. Judge findings are accorded somewhat less
deference than jury findings, at least in common comparisons of the clear
error standard with directed verdict standards. On the face of things,
this result seems surprising since judges are trained professionils who
constantly gain experience with the tasks of deciding disputes presented
according to our rules of adversary trial, while jurors ordinarily are ama-
teurs without substantial experience in this eccentric process (apart from
the vicarious experience provided by television and an occasional motion
picture). One obvious explanation for the difference springs from our
traditional and constitutionalized reverence for jury trial. Another draws
from the fact that jury verdicts are subject to discretionary control
through the trial judge's power to grant a new trial while there is no
comparable outside review of trial judge findings in the district court.
Perhaps more important, trial judges can be forced to articulate detailed
findings of fact in ways that juries cannot duplicate, even with the use of
interrogatories or special verdicts. Many jury verdicts stand because of
findings that might have been made within the outermost reaches of rea-
son, not because of findings actually made. Still more important, how-
ever, is that the comparison between clear error and directed verdict
standards means very little. Each standard is shifting and fugitive. The
most that can be said is that trial and appellate judges, taken collectively,
are more like each other and less like jurors. The standards of review
take these matters into account.
Another obvious factor to consider is the ability of the trial judge to
evaluate the demeanor of witnesses. This factor is embraced in the re-
quirement of Rule 52(a) that "due regard shall be given to the opportu-
nity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." There
is room still to wonder whether the opportunity to evaluate the de-
meanor of witnesses at trial actually enhances the fact-finding process.
The outward signs of lying are extraordinarily subtle and complex.20
The trial judge may easily be distracted by the effort to unravel the sig-
nals of demeanor in ways that even a subsequent study of the paper rec-
19 Two recent explorations of these problems are provided by Carrington, The Function of the
Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C.L. REv. 411 (1987) and Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and
Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 S.C.L. REv. 393 (1987).
20 A lengthy accounting of the complex ways in which deceit may be reflected in externally visi-
ble manifestations is provided by P. EKMAN, TELLING LIES (1985).
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ord cannot undo. Nonetheless, it is our firm tradition, and the belief of
most today, that great regard is "due" the trial judge's opportunity to
evaluate demeanor. It is difficult to show clear error in a decision.to be-
lieve a single witness, or in a decision to disbelieve a single witness unless
the witness is the seldom encountered perfect witness who is uninter-
ested, unimpeached, and uncontradicted by any circumstance. It is
nearly impossible to show clear error in a choice between two or more
witnesses whose testimony is at all plausible.2 1
The 1985 amendment making it clear that the clear error standard
applies to findings based on documentary evidence provides the richest
basis for exploring the institutional factors that affect the allocation of
responsibility for the facts between trial judges and appellate courts.22
In a variety of circumstances, a case may be submitted to a judge for a
"trial"-not summary judgment-on the basis of stipulations, discovery
materials, documents, or even the transcript of a trial before another
judge or tribunal. Demeanor has nothing to do with the process. In
these circumstances, it is easy to argue that the court of appeals has avail-
able the very same basis for decision as the trial court had. Why, then,
should any deference be extended to trial court findings of fact inferred
from the paper record? In a famous decision, Orvis v. Higgins,23 the Sec-
ond Circuit indeed ruled that when a trial judge "decides a fact issue on
written evidence alone, we are as able as he to determine credibility, and
so we may disregard his finding."'24 The 1985 amendment squarely re-
jects this approach, as had most other courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court.25 The reasons for rejecting the Second Circuit approach provide
rich insights into the institutional relationships caught up in the clear
error rule.
Among the reasons often given for deferring to findings based on a
paper record are those that focus on appellate burdens. The more diffi-
cult it is to win reversal, the smaller the number of appeals likely to be
taken. Mere reduction in the number of appeals does not have any obvi-
ous intrinsic virtue. Appellate courts should be responsible for deciding
cases as well as possible, and should not narrow the standard of review
simply to avoid the responsibility of decision. Nonetheless, if we cannot
or will not increase appellate capacity to the point needed to employ the
best standard of review, it may be wise to serve the interests of all liti-
gants by adopting-standards of review that help sift out all but the more
extreme claims of error. Reduction in the number of appeals also may
21 The problem of appellate review of credibility determinations in the slightly different setting
ofjury trials is explored in Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 903, 928-55 (1971).
22 See supra note 7.
23 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
24 Id. at 539 (Frank, J.) (footnote omitted).
25 In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), the Court ruled that findings
based on physical or documentary evidence are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. It
noted the contrary rule announced in Orvis v. Higgins, but concluded that it is impossible to trace the
Orris v. Higgins rule "back to the text of Rule 52 .. " Id. at 574. Court of appeals decisions are
explored in 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILL.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2587 (1971 & Supp.
1988).
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help to maintain a regional circuit structure. In addition, it may be useful
to the parties-not only to the appellee who is spared the burden of ap-
peal, but also to would-be appellants who might be encouraged to take
bootless appeals in cases that, to a disinterested eye, are doomed from
the beginning.2 6 However many appeals are taken, moreover, appeals
courts can devote more of their limited capacities to developing the law if
they are freed from the obligation of making searching inquiry into case-
specific matters of fact.
Other reasons for deferring to findings based on a paper record fo-
cus on the trial courts. One argument frequently advanced is that the
prestige of trial courts is enhanced by limiting the scope of review. This
argument may be directed to the hope that enhanced prestige may help
lure good people to the district bench,27 or may focus more broadly on
the need to maintain the acceptability of trial court decisions in a system
that cannot afford to provide appeals in all cases for all litigants.28 Such
arguments, however, depend on the belief that trial court decisions in
fact deserve respect. Federal district judges indeed are very good, and
deserve deep respect. For present purposes, it may be more important
to observe that in many ways a narrow standard of review may work to
enhance the quality of district court findings and thus to fulfill its own
prophecy.
The most obvious ways in which the quality of trial court findings is
enhanced by a narrow standard of review depend on the behavior of the
parties and the judge. Parties who know that they will not have any sig-
nificant second chance to convince another tribunal on the facts must
take the initial trial seriously. If there is any reason to believe in our
adversary system of trial, more serious party effort should lead to better
decisions. In like fashion, a judge who knows that the central responsi-
bility of decision cannot be shared is likely to take the task of decision
more seriously. A narrow standard of review, further, may avoid an arti-
ficial incentive to demand jury trial that could lead parties who believe in
the immediate emotional impact of their cases to demand jury trial sim-
ply to avoid the risks of searching and unemotional appellate review.
There also are less obvious reasons for believing that a narrow stan-
dard of review may enhance the quality of trial judge decisions. These
reasons depend on the rough outlines of the trial and appellate court
structure we have chosen to create. Once it has been decided that there
should be a first trial but not a second trial de novo, and that courts of
26 The theory that both parties are helped by strict standards of review was stated in Anderson:
Mhe parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and re-
sources on persuading that trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one: requiring
them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. Anderson, 470 U.S.
at 575.
Of course at least one party is often eager for the opportunity to expend energy and resources
on a second chance. The primary justification for limiting the standard of review must be protection
of the other parties and the courts. There is some added justification, however, in the paternalistic
prospect of conferring an undesired benefit on the party who is discouraged from appealing despite
dissatisfaction with the trial court disposition.
27 See Nangle, supra note 16, at 426-27.
28 See Wright, supra note 8, at 779-82.
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appeals should have important responsibilities for developing the law, it
is necessary to create trial and appellate procedures, and to appoint trial
and appellate judges, with an eye on this basic structure. It is almost
inevitable that these procedures will resemble the procedures we now
have. The standard of fact review can be expanded or contracted, but it
will be applied in any event by appellate judges chosen more for their
capacities in law than for their abilities to find facts, and through a proce-
dure that involves consideration of selected facts rather than a patient
and concerted review of the record as a whole.29 If we continue to rely
on appellate panels of three judges, moreover, the difficulties of conjoint
fact-finding must be considered. To use a homely analogy, it is easier to
criticize a symphony than to write one, and much easier for one person to
write a symphony than for a panel of three. Thus the Supreme Court has
suggested that "duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of ap-
peals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact
determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources."3 0
If it is right that we could expect substantial improvements in fact-
finding on review only by making substantial changes in the basic struc-
ture of our trial and appellate courts, it is entirely appropriate to do
everything we can to enhance the quality of trial court fact-finding. We
can, and have, adopted trial court procedures and standards of appellate
review that make trial judges primarily responsible for most pretrial and
trial rulings. We have adopted rules of appeal jurisdiction that by and
large prevent appellate intrusion before final judgment. To the extent
that these efforts succeed, we can entrench the justifications for narrow-
ing the standard of appellate review. The benefits may be further in-
creases in the quality of trial court findings and enhancement of the
quality of justice provided by trial and appellate courts acting together.
These benefits are important for those who appeal. They may be even
more important for those who could not afford to appeal; if we are un-
comfortable with the prospect that "better" justice might be available to
those who can afford to appeal,3 ' narrowing the standard of review may
help directly those who cannot appeal rather than simply deny the better
brand ofjustice to those who can.
Most cases, of course, are not decided on paper records alone. As
soon as oral testimony enters the picture, the reasons for adopting a nar-
row standard of review are reinforced by the belief that trial judge deter-
minations of credibility are better than appellate determinations. It is no
response to suggest that a trial judge need merely spell out each portion
of the testimony of each witness that is believed or not believed, thereby
providing the appellate court a foundation of direct fact equivalent to the
29 Professor Wright compared the trial process of the appellate process as follows: "[Tihe trial
judge has the advantage of having made the initial sifting of the entire record and of having put it
into logical sequence, while the appellate court has lawyers before it picking out bits and pieces of
the record to attack or defend a particular finding." Id. at 782.
30 Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75.
31 Professor Wright framed this concern as a question: "If in two similar cases the person rich
enough to afford an appeal gets a reversal, howeverjust, while the person of insufficient means to
risk an appeal is forced to live with the judgment of the trial court, has justice really been im-
proved?" Wright, supra note 8, at 780.
1988] RULE 52
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foundation provided by an entirely paper record. The chore of such ar-
ticulation would itself be considerable. More important, the tasks of as-
sessing credibility and drawing inferences are not independent. The
determination whether to believe the testimony that affirms or that which
denies receipt of a letter accepting an offer to contract, for example, may
depend not only on demeanor but on the detailed inferences suggested
by the entire testimony of each witness and on the correspondence be-
tween those inferences and the full fact setting. This difference between
cases decided entirely on paper records and cases in which oral testi-
mony intrudes suggests that application of the clear error standard
should depend on the nature of the record. While clear error must be
found to reverse, it is easier for an appellate court to find clear error
when it has the same materials for decision as were available to the trial
court. Although it has been suggested that the 1985 amendment of Rule
52(a) requires that the same deference be extended to findings based on
a paper record, 32 the Supreme Court has recognized that greater defer-
ence is due to findings based on the credibility of witnesses. 33 In addi-
tion, it has suggested that more searching review is appropriate if there is
a conflict between testimonial and documentary evidence.3 4 Here, then,
is at last a first illustration: the actual degree of scrutiny required by the
clear error standard varies according to the nature of the evidence.
Even as to matters of fact-genuine, historic fact-there are other
reasons as well for recognizing that the clear error standard provides va-
riable measures of review. The Supreme Court has suggested, for exam-
ple, that less searching review should be provided "as the trial becomes
longer and more complex.... when trial judges have lived with the con-
troversy for weeks or months instead ofjust a few hours." 35 This sugges-
tion cannot be based only on the enhanced cost of retrying longer cases,
since proceedings on remand injudge-tried cases ordinarily need not du-
plicate the original trial. Instead, it must reflect an appreciation of the
extent to which the familiarity of prolonged exposure can enhance the
empathetic and intuitive aspects of decision. Appellate courts may well
be less able to offset the advantages of exposure to the living trial as the
length of the trial grows.
32 In McFarland v. T.E. Mercer Trucking Co., 781 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1986), the court con-
cluded that a trial judge finding based on depositions is entitled to the same deference as a finding
"based on oral, in-court testimony." Id. at 1148.
33 After ruling that the clearly errouneous rule applies to findings based on physical or docu-
mentary evidence, the Court went on to state: "When findings are based on determinations regard-
ing the crediblity of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's
findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that
bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said." Anderson, 470 U.S. at
575. Several court of appeals decisions reflecting the view that the clearly erroneous standard ap-
plies differently to findings based on documentary or otherwise undisputed evidence are collected in
9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2587 n.36 (Supp. 1988).
34 The testimony of witnesses denying that they had acted in concert was elicited by "questions
in extremely leading form.... Where such testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous docu-
ments we can give it little weight, particularly when the crucial issues involve mixed questions of law
and fact. Despite the opportunity of the trial court to appraise the credibility of the witnesses, we
cannot.., rule otherwise than that Finding 118 is clearly erroneous." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1948).
35 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984).
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Application of the clear error standard also should vary according to
the standard of proof imposed at trial. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that application of directed verdict standards should be adjusted to
reflect the fact that more evidence is required to persuade a rational jury
if the proposition must be proved by clear and convincing evidence than
if the proposition need be proved only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.3 6 The same proposition seems to underlie reversal of the trial
court findings in Baumgartner v. United States.37 The policies thatjustify an
enhanced standard of proof apply equally to justify an enhanced level of
appellate scrutiny; the issue is one that justifies an increased expenditure
of appellate resources, within the limits of relative appellate and trial
judge capacities to find the facts.
More searching appellate review also is appropriate if a trial court
has adopted, essentially verbatim, findings proposed by one party. The
courts apply the clear error standard to such cases, at times even when
there is telling circumstantial evidence that the district judge has not un-
dertaken the responsibility of independent decision.38 Nonetheless, such
decisions do not justify the ordinary assumption that the trial judge has
made full use of the comparative advantages that warrant appellate def-
erence. Application of the clear error standard should be adjusted
accordingly.
A more troubling question is raised by the prospect that the level of
appellate scrutiny may be adjusted according to the level of confidence
reposed in the particular district judge who made the findings. Years of
experience with a particular judge may convince a court of appeals that
his findings are less trustworthy than the findings of other judges, either
in particular categories of cases touched by some bias or across the full
range of cases. Careful observers have asserted that in fact courts of ap-
peals provide more searching review in such cases.39 It seems very likely
that this observation is correct. It also seems likely that the practice is
right. Perhaps it is best that we trust the courts of appeals to use such a
36 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986).
37 322 U.S. 665 (1944). For a discussion of the Baumgartner case, see infra note 83 and accompa-
nying text.
38 The Supreme Court has described its earlier decisions as suggesting "that even when the trial
judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed
only if clearly erroneous." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985). Theclearly
erroneous rule was applied to affirm findings, after correction of mathematical and typographical
errors, in Falcon Constr. Co. v. Economy Forms Corp., 805 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986). The
court of appeals noted that the district court opinion was rendered two years after the conclusion of
a 6-day trial, following issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel entry ofjudgment. 805 F.2d at
1232. "The district court then adopted much of EFCO's proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law-often verbatim, including typographical errors and erroneous mathematical calculations -
and entered judgement .... 805 F.2d at 1232.
39 A leading civil procedure text states: "lAin appellate court's inclination to accept a trial
judge's findings depends .... on the court's unstated degree of confidence in the trial judge's fair-
mindedness." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.8, at 668 (3d. ed. 1985). Professor
Louis, after noting that appellate courts arguably are free to take a hard look at any "suspicious"
finding of ultimate fact, adds that although appellate courts will not admit it, former appellate law
clerks will, off the record, "[riegularly attest that both important cases and the decisions of certain
notorious trial judges are scrutinized more carefully than others." Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Deci-
sion Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unifed View of Review, The Judge/Juy Ques-
tion, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 1015-16 & n.160 (1986).
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power wisely but surreptitiously-open announcement that heightened
scrutiny is accorded the findings of some judges would carry severe con-
sequences, and (in part because of those consequences) would deter use
of the power.
Preliminary injunction findings raise a different problem. Rule 52 (a)
expressly requires that findings of fact be made in granting or reftising
interlocutory injunctions. The procedure leading to such interlocutory
decisions, however, may be much less thorough than full trial procedure,
and indeed may be nothing more than a contest of affidavits. It is tempt-
ing to suggest that application of the clear error test should be adjusted
to reflect this procedure. On balance, however, the suggestion is not
persuasive. The court of appeals has no more satisfactory a basis for de-
cision than the district court. The problem is simply different from the
problems of review after trial; there is no cogent basis for a general prac-
tice of more, or less, searching review.
One final example may be offered as a bridge to the law application
questions discussed in the next part. Contract interpretation often de-
pends on evidence extrinsic to the writing; in such cases the clear error
rule applies. In some cases, however, the process of interpretation pro-
ceeds solely within the four comers of the document, perhaps as illumi-
nated by uncontested facts surrounding the transaction. Courts of
appeals have been willing to review some such cases free of the clear
error rule.40 The general rule that clear error review applies to decisions
based on documentary evidence should not bar this practice. At least in
some circumstances, the courts of appeals will bring to such problems
the same comparative advantage they bring to questions of law. These
advantages can be particularly important with respect to form contracts
used in many transactions, where the courts of appeals may be able to
achieve a significant measure of uniformity and predictability. In such
cases it is appropriate to treat interpretation as a question of law, free of
Rule 52(a).
The standard of review also should vary according to the nature of
the legal rules involved in each case and the nature of the uncertainties
that must be resolved. The reasons for distinguishing between different
rules of law are explored in the ensuing discussion of law application
problems. The nature of the uncertainties to be resolved affects the stan-
dard of review in the same way as the formally articulated standard of
proof. The preponderance of the evidence standard applied to most is-
sues in civil litigation does not in fact represent a single and unvarying
standard of persuasion. As a simple illustration, it is more important that
the defendant be correctly identified as one who had some involvement
with the events in suit than it is that each element of damages be pre-
cisely determined following a proper determination of liability.
40 E.g., Lumber & Wood Prods., Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 708 F.2d 916, 918 (11th Cir.
1987); Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co., 747 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1984).
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All of these reflections underscore the proposition that trial courts
are primarily responsible for sifting the evidence and finding the facts,4 1
while appellate courts are primarily responsible for developing the
law.42 One obvious qualification of this proposition arises with review of
law application, the problem addressed in the next part. A less obvious
qualification is imposed by the fact that we trust courts of appeals to
make law only when law-making is required to decide a case. The entire
enterprise of appellate decision-making depends on the need to decide
cases, and that need can be justified only if there is some measure of
responsibility for correct decision. Courts of appeals cannot avoid com-
pletely the task of ensuring that there is a plausible fact platform for their
declarations of law. 43
Finally, residual appellate responsibility for the facts is underscored
by the vocabulary chosen to express respect for trial judge findings. The
clear error rule inescapably means that in many cases the court that af-
firmed findings of fact also would have affirmed contrary findings. Yet
we do not ordinarily speak of fact-finding as a discretionary function of
district judges.44 Even though the judge himself may not be fully confi-
dent of his findings, responding to the dilemma of uncertainty only by
determining whether the party with the burden of persuasion has re-
duced the uncertainty to the point at which action is warranted, we view
the effort as an attempt to be right. In a very real sense, appellate review
asks not whether the findings were right but only whether they were
dearly wrong. Nonetheless the matter is treated as one of right and
wrong, not one of discretion. In this way too, appellate courts recognize
some measure of shared responsibility that is not properly transferred by
reliance on district court discretion.
IV. Law Application
The clearly erroneous standard limits review of "findings of fact."
By long understanding, appellate courts undertake independent redeter-
mination of questions of law. Deference to trial court expositions of the
41 A court of appeals is reluctant to reverse trial judge findings. "This is true to a considerable
degree even when thejudge has not seen the witnesses. His duty is to sift the evidence, to put it into
logical sequence and to make the proper inferences from it; and in the case of a record of over
40,000 pages like that before us, it is physically impossible for an appellate court to function at all
without ascribing some prima fade validity to his conclusions." United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
42 "Mhe main reason for appellate deference to the findings of fact made by the trial court is
not the appellate court's lack of access to the materials for decision but that its main responsiblity is
to maintain the uniformity and coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged in if the only
question is the legal significance of a particular and nonrecurring set of historial events." Mucha v.
King, 792 F.2d 602, 605-06 (7th cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
43 Judge Phillips has made this point nicely: "The impluse to depart from the formal design in
order to announce a legal principle arises from an anomaly at the heart of our system of appellate
review as it has evolved. ,The declarative, legislative function of appellate courts can only be rightly
exercised as a by-product of their more mundane corrective function." Phillips, The Appellate Review
Function" Scope of Review, 47 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 1, 6 (1984). "This is a particularly ironic cir-
cumstance for those who would rate the declarative function as the more important of the two." Id
at n.12.
44 Professor Louis does prefer the language of discretion: "Thus, fact-finding is a form of dis-
cretionary power as defined by and within the limits set by law." Louis, supra note 39, at 999.
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law depends on the cogency of the exposition and, perhaps, individual-
ized measures of respect for the trial judge. It is now common to recog-
nize that there is a third category, law application, that has the
characteristics of both law-making and fact-finding. Law application does
not always involve this blend. There may be a clear rule that a seventeen-
year-old lacks capacity to contract and a specific finding that the party
charged on a contract was seventeen years old when the contract was
made. The finding provides a clear basis for automatic application of the
legal rule; appellate judges are as able to perform the task as a trial
judge. Often, however, judges are unable or unwilling to elaborate legal
rules to the level of articulated detail that would permit mechanical appli-
cation of rule to fact. Instead, the rules are expressed in more general
terms that require particularized application to specific facts.
The familiar standard of reasonable care imposed by negligence law
is the most common example. Application of such general standards to
specific facts is in part law-making, because it generates a specific rule of
conduct, albeit one that initially is good only for a specific case. At the
same time, the process of application is so fact-specific that it may seem
inseparable from the fact-finding process.
The obvious response to the law application process would be to
create a third standard of appellate review. Determinations of historic
fact, on the basis of direct testimony or by a process of inference, would
be reviewed by the limited standard of clear error. Rules of law would be
reviewed de novo. Law application would be reviewed by some different,
presumably intermediate, standard. Courts have not made this choice.
Instead, they adhere to the fiction that all determinations are reviewed
either as if rulings of law or as if findings of fact. This fiction has the
virtue of avoiding the need for explicit differentiations of standards of
review, and seems to be leading more and more to treating matters of
law application as if matters of fact.45 Unfortunately the fiction, as trans-
parent as it is, has not escaped the common vice of obscuring the realities
of appellate behavior. Appellate courts actually invoke a wide array of
standards of review, more or less searching, as appropriate to different
tasks of law application. The variety of these standards of review has
given rise to the most interesting questions of appellate review, and the
most interesting literature. The following discussion seeks to highlight
the most important problems.
Academics have long known that it is artificial to allocate law applica-
tion problems to review by the standards applied to questions of fact, or
instead to review by the standards applied to questions of law. Judge
Clark made the point clear during the debates that led to adoption of the
clearly erroneous standard in Rule 52(a), 46 and many have made the
45 Professor Louis has argued that it is not wise to attempt an open, avowed determination that
some matters of law application are better suited to trial courts, others to appellate courts. Such a
process would "be endless, confusing and uncertain. A general rule presumptively favoring either
the fact finders or the appellate judges, with whatever controls and exceptions are necessary, is all
that is practically possible-and is in fact what we have now." Louis, supra note 39, at 1012-13.
46 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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point since.47 The Supreme Court has not lagged far behind the aca-
demics. Perhaps predictably, one of the nicest statements was provided
by an academic turned Justice. Felix Frankfurter wrote, not long after
adoption of Rule 52(a), that findings based on application of standards of
law may be labeled findings of fact, or insteAd may be labeled questions
of law, "but that is often not an illuminating test and is never self-execut-
ing."48 More recent decisions tend to state simply that the distinction
between law and fact for purposes of identifying the standard of review is
not easy. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,4 9 for example, Justice White char-
acterized the distinction between fact and law as "vexing," lamented that
"Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distin-
guishing law from fact," 50 and noted with apparent relief that the case
could be decided without addressing the "much-mooted issue of the ap-
plicability of the Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and fact,
-i.e., questions ... whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated." 5'
Two years later, Justice Stevens suggested that the point at which
the line is drawn between law and fact "varies according to the nature of
the substantive law at issue."' 52 When faced with the problem of assess-
ing the obviousness of a patented invention, the Court asked the Federal
Circuit to provide its "informed opinion on the complex issue of the de-
gree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact." 53 And
outside Rule 52(a) cases, the Court has confessed openly that
the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as
a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the issue in question. Where,
for example, . . . the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only
through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the
Court has been reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions pre-
sumptive force .... In contrast, other considerations often suggest
the appropriateness of resolving close questions concerning the status
of an issue as one of "law" or "fact" in favor of extending deference to
the trial court .... 54
47 Dean Carrington put the matter succinctly:
To paraphrase a doubting remark ofJabez Fox, findings of fact may be defined as the
class of decisions we choose to leave to the trier of fact subject only to limited review, while
conclusions of law are the class of decisions which reviewers choose to make for themselves
without deference to the judgment of the trial forum.
Carrington, The Power of Distict Judges and The Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507, 518
(1969) (footnotes omitted). Professor Monaghan's elegant statement is that fact, law, and law appli-
cation are not "static, polar opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of
rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience." Monaghan, Constituional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985).
48 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
49 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
50 Id at 288.
51 Id at 289 n.16.
52 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984).
53 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
54 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (citations omitted). A similar statement was made
in United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2419-2420 (1988).
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The fundamental secret is out, and notoriously so. Characterization
of an issue of law application as fact or law for purposes of identifying a
formalized standard of review depends on the perceived need for review,
not on the actual status of the issue.
Several difficulties remain. One is that of determining which issues
of law application should be formally assigned the status of fact, which
the status of law. Another is that of confessing that the actual standard of
review does not depend entirely on the choice of category. The most
important is identifying the characteristics that justify more searching ap-
pellate review or instead warrant greater reliance on trial judge deci-
sions. All three of these problems are best discussed together.
At the outset, it may be useful to reflect again on the analogy to jury
trial. Allocation of responsibilities between juries and judges, both trial
and appellate, ordinarily is accomplished by characterizing matters as is-
sues of fact for the jury or as matters of law for the court. Vast volumes
of authority are available for guidance in applying Rule 52(a) if the prob-
lem is the same. Yet there is no a priori reason for believing that the
allocations of responsibility between judges and jury should always be
guided by the same considerations which guide allocation between trial
judges and appellate judges. The inquiry should not stop with observing
that directed verdict standards are not the same as Rule 52(a) clear error
standards. A cogent argument has been made, for instance, that defer-
ence to juries in negligence cases arises from the fact that six or twelve
jury members have more experience with the activities ordinarily in-
volved in negligence cases, justifying treatment of negligence law appli-
cation as a matter of fact, while three appellate judges have more
experience than a single trial judge, justifying characterization as an issue
of law for purposes of Rule 52(a).5 5 The specific argument need not be
accepted-and I do not accept it-to agree with the basic principle. The
problems of judicial law application are different, and should be ap-
proached independently.
Several factors may work to give law application responsibility to dis-
trict judges. Many can be illustrated by considering the question of neg-
ligence. Most of the courts of appeals treat findings of negligence as
matters of fact, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.5 6 Per-
haps the most obvious justification is that this matter is one of individual
case administration, important to the parties but ordinarily not important
to the appellate function of developing the law. Another justification is
that trial judges often will be unable to make findings sufficiently detailed
to communicate the full factual basis for the decision to the court of ap-
peals. The conclusion that an accident would not have happened unless
the defendant was driving at a rate of speed unreasonable in all the cir-
cumstances, for instance, may spring more from the trial judge's familiar-
ity with the entire record than from any specific articulable fact. Still
other justifications may be found in the beliefs that de novo appellate
determination would not really achieve greater uniformity by treating
55 Weiner, The Civil Nonjuy Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1020, 1033 (1967).
56 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2590 (1971 & Supp. 1988).
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like cases alike, that little added guidance would be provided by appellate
disposition, and that individual disposition of individual cases is at least
as fair as ever more detailed pronouncements on the rules of negligence
law. There even may be a belief that trial judges can enhance justice by
an intuitive disregard for the law in ways that appellate courts cannot
duplicate. Trial judges might seem more similar to juries than to appel-
late judges in this regard, in part because of their intimate familiarity
with their cases and in part because it is out of character for appellate
courts to connive at disregarding the law that is their special
responsibility.
Other factors may work to draw law application responsibility to ap-
pellate courts. Many can be illustrated by the ruling in Bose Corporation v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,57 that Rule 52(a) does not apply to a
finding that a disparaging statement about the sound quality of the plain-
tiff's loudspeakers was made with "actual malice." The most general fac-
tor was the Court's concern, reiterated in many ways, that it has not been
able to articulate the controlling first amendment standards with suffi-
cient clarity to ensure accurate understanding by lower courts. A process
of case-by-case adjudication remains necessary, at least for the time be-
ing, to help develop the rule and guard against misapplication. The most
particular factor was the Court's concern with the need "to preserve the
precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution."58
Other cases as well, however, will present more or less distinctive con-
cerns that accurate enforcement of some rights is more important than
accurate enforcement of others. Another concern, expressed with diplo-
matic indirection, was that close review is necessary to protect against
biases of trial courts; in the first amendment context, the concern was
expressed as the need to preserve adjudication that is content neutral. In
other contexts, such as employment discrimination cases, similar con-
cerns may affect the actual standard of review even though the clearly
erroneous phrase is invoked. Beyond these specific concerns, other cases
may arise in which appellate scrutiny of law application is enhanced be-
cause uniformity, predictability, and reliability are thought both desirable
and attainable.
Given these competing concerns and constraints, it is easy to predict
that characterization of law application issues will vary across the wide
range such issues cover, and even as to a single issue may vary over time.
As appellate courts feel increasing pressure on their collective capacities
for decision, there is a temptation to increase the number of matters re-
57 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
58 Id. at 511. The extent to which a special standard of review is applied in first amendment
cases will depend on the relative importance of the desire "to preserve the precious liberties" as
compared to lack of clearly articulated standards. If searching review is justified primarily by the
desire to protect free expression, it might be argued that less searching review is appropriate if the
district court has upheld a claimed first amendment right. The disagreement of the circuit courts of
appeals on this issue is described in Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 108 S. Ct. 1280
(1988) (whiteJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). If such distinctions are to be drawn, care will
be required to distinguish cases in which a first amendment right is upheld at the expense of a
private party and cases in which the right is upheld at the expense of a public party.
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viewable only for clear error, and hence called issues of fact. It may be
that some such process is in fact occurring now.
Far more important, it is clear that these competing concerns and
constraints cannot be accommodated by a single standard of review,
whether it be de novo review, clear error review, or some single interme-
diate standard. Courts, in fact, tailor the level of review to the perceived
needs of particular classes of cases. 59 Several examples may be offered to
support this assertion.
The first examples draw from the inability to articulate legal rules
with such clarity that lower court application is fully trusted. Rules of law
are useful means of control, 60 but only to the extent that they can be
stated with unescapable clarity. The Bose case affords one specific exam-
ple. Another, rather older, was United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co. 61 The Court rejected lower court findings that the New River was not
navigable. Explaining the reasons for putting aside the "two court" rule
that counsels against Supreme Court review of trial court findings af-
firmed by a court of appeals, the Court confessed that with respect to
such issues,
facts and their constitutional significance are too closely connected to
make the two-court rule a serviceable guide. The legal concept of nav-
igability embraces both public and private interests. It is not to be
determined by a formula.... We do not purport now to lay down any
single definitive test.... Both the standards and the ultimate conclu-
sion involve questions of law inseparable from the particular facts to
which they are applied. 62
A third and wonderfully rich example of the inability to articulate
precise legal rules may seem more ambiguous. One of the most famous
fact review decisions is Commissioner v. Duberstein.63 Duberstein was presi-
dent of a company that bought products from Mohawk; frequently Du-
berstein suggested potential customers to Mohawk. Eventually Mohawk
gave Duberstein a new Cadillac. The Tax Court found the Cadillac was
59 Dean Carrington again put the matter well. After observing differences between review of
judge and jury findings, he continued:
The difference amongst these tests is insubstantial. The principle which restrains review is
too plastic to be subject to such refinements of language. The scope of review must be
shaped to particular factors in each case, such as the value of the substantive principle in-
voked, the likelihood of a misapplication resulting from stubborn disregard or limited un-
derstanding by the trier of fact, and the nature and extent of the evidence on which the
findings rest. Also, the scope of review will be responsive to differences in the nature of the
forum under review. This rich mix will remain constant in its variation.
Carrington, supra note 47, at 520-21.
Professors James and Hazard have observed that "the substantive question at issue makes an
important difference, although this is not often openly acknowledged." F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, CrVL
PROCEDURE § 12.8, at 668 (3d ed. 1985). Professor Oliver has suggested that appellate intervention
is less likely if the legal standard involved is a nontechnical, colloquial one drawing on common
sense. Oliver, Appellate Fact Review Under Rule 52(a): An Analysis and Critique of Sixth Circuit Precedent,
16 U. TOL. L. REV. 667 (1985).
60 Many writers have observed that appellate courts can enhance their own power in relation to
trial courts by announcing more detailed and refined rules of law, reducing the need for individual-
ized creativity in the law application process. See Louis, supra note 39, at 1019-27.
61 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
62 Id. at 404.
63 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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income, not a gift, because the only justifiable inference was that it was
intended to be remuneration for services rendered. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, and the circuit court in turn was reversed. Most
of the Supreme Court opinion was devoted to the vagueness of the con-
cept of "gift" for income tax purposes, and to the reasons for not at-
tempting a more detailed statement of criteria that would control the
distinction between gifts and income. Quoting from Justice Cardozo's
opinion dealing with a different tax problem, the Court observed that
"[t]he standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way
of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle."6'
The Court then went on to a much-quoted passage:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately
on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case.
The nontechnical nature of the statutory standard, the close relation-
ship of it to the data of practical human experience, and the multiplic-
ity of relevant factual elements, with their various combinations,
creating the necessity of ascribing the proper force to each, confirm us
in our conclusion that primary weight in this area must be given to the
conclusions of the trier of fact.65
The Court concluded that appellate review must be "quite re-
stricted," and findings of a district judge or the Tax Court must follow
the standard of Rule 52(a). Justice Frankfurter dissented, arguing that
the Court should adopt a presumption that such business-related trans-
actions give rise to income, and urging that more detailed rules should
be developed to make tax administration as uniform as possible.66 The
Court's most revealing response to this dissent was the observation that
diversity of result would be lessened since tax decisions tend to be re-
ported, "and since there may be a natural tendency of professional triers
of fact to follow one another's determinations, even as to factual
matters."6 7
Although the Duberstein opinion thus clearly invoked the clear error
standard of review, it provides a compelling illustration of an issue that
often should be reviewed more intensely than a finding of negligence.
The need for uniform treatment of taxpayers perhaps cannot be met by
stating more elaborate rules, which could easily be met by artificial con-
trivance and avoidance. Certainly the Supreme Court should not at-
tempt to write tax code provisions that the Internal Revenue Service
cannot wrest from Congress or promulgate by legitimate regulations.
But if elaboration of legal rules is not wise, the need for uniformity
should be met in part by an enhanced degree of appellate scrutiny. The
64 Id at 288 n.9 (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).
65 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289 (citations omitted).
66 l at 294-98. Dean Griswold was more sharply critical of the Court's failure to develop
"some guides and standards," and its "undue and unfortunate yielding of responsibility to juries and
other triers of the facts." He even suggested thatJustice Cardozo's language, as elegant as it was, is
essentially empty. Griswold, Foreword Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARv.
L. REv. 81, 88-91 (1960).
67 363 U.S. at 290.
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Court's surprising suggestion that triers of fact might follow each other
implicitly recognizes as much.
Closely related to an appeals court's inability to articulate detailed
rules of law is its ability to insist that district courts make detailed find-
ings of fact. Review of law application is facilitated by elaborate findings
of the fact assumptions made for the purpose of decision. It is to be
expected that courts of appeals will insist on more elaborate findings in
cases in which they hope to exercise more searching review. Employ-
ment discrimination cases provide a fine example of this proposition.
The employment discrimination cases begin, for present purposes,
with Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 68 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
permits employment practices adopted pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system, so long as the differences arising from the seniority system "are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race." 69 Pull-
man-Standard was organized by the United Steelworkers ("USW") and
the International Association of Machinists ("IAM") in 1941; IAM gradu-
ally ceded some workers from its bargaining unit to the USW, so that
IAM represented an all-white unit and USW represented a racially mixed
unit. A departmental seniority system was adopted in 1954; employees
transferring from one department to another lost all seniority. The dis-
trict court upheld the validity of the seniority system. It found that the
system applied equally to all employees, black and white, because ap-
proximately equal numbers of employees in each group were affected;
that the departmental structure was rational as a matter of standard in-
dustry practice and as a matter of the employer's own situation; that the
seniority system, although adopted during a period of substantial dis-
crimination, was adopted for reasons in no way related to the discrimina-
tory practices; and that there was no discriminatory purpose. The court
of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court in turn reversed, finding sub-
stantial indications that the court of appeals had made an independent
determination on the issue of intent, and in any event clearly had erred in
making its own findings rather than remanding for new district court
findings to replace findings infected by legal error. The Court stated that
intent to discriminate on account of race "is a pure question of fact, sub-
ject to Rule 52(a)'s clearly-erroneous standard. It is not a question of law
and not a mixed question of law and fact." '70
The Pullman-Standard opinion provides an invaluable illustration of
the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between facts inferred and
facts evaluated and characterized according to some concept of law. The
concept of intent chosen from among the familiar varieties of intent
seems to be one of purpose: the issue was identified as whether the sen-
iority system was "adopted because of its racially discriminatory im-
pact." 7' It was this motivating desire that was characterized as a matter
of pure fact. The purpose of a single individual can readily be character-
68 456 U.S 273 (1982).
69 Id. at 276 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982)).
70 Id. at 287-88.
71 Id at 277.
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ized as a question of fact in some senses. Characterization of the pur-
pose of at least two large organizations, an employer and a union, is
more difficult. If there were a clear showing that a single middle-man-
agement employee or mid-level union bargainer had a discriminatory in-
tent, for example, attribution of that iridividual intent to one or both
organizations is easy only if the applicable legal standard puts aside all
questions of causal connection between the role of one individual and a
process of group decision. Looking for difficulty in another direction,
the Court stated that since actual intent is required, such intent cannot
be "presumed" from the fact of differential impact. At the same time, it
asserted that discriminatory impact is part of the evidence to be consid-
ered in determining whether to find an actual intent to discriminate. The
fact-finding process that infers actual intent from actual impact, reason-
ing that employer and union must have desired the results actually
achieved, is entirely rational. Yet in this process it is difficult to separate
the fact-finder's evaluation of the results from the characterization of the
accompanying state of mind. Finally, the intent to be found includes the
element of discrimination. Unless discrimination means no more than
differential impact, it seems impossible to separate a conclusion of dis-
criminatory intent from legal concepts of permissible and impermissible
differentiation. The Court's bland assertion that the question of purpose
is a matter of "pure fact" covers over a number of elements that can be
divorced from law application only with difficulty, if at all.
Whether or not discriminatory intent is a matter of pure fact, there
are good reasons to believe that relatively stringent appellate review is
appropriate. In the early years of Title VII, legal standards required sub-
stantial development; searching review was appropriate to test the depth
of trial court understanding. Even now, with a relatively mature body of
race discrimination law, it seems appropriate to provide more searching
review than in negligence cases. Race discrimination remains an impor-
tant problem. Discrimination litigation often involves the interests of
many people, not only those who may have suffered discrimination but
others as well. Injunctive decrees may have profound effects long into
the future. There even may be a risk that some trial judges are less hos-
pitable to the purposes of antidiscrimination legislation than others.
One way to facilitate more searching review of discrimination find-
ings under the clear error rubric is to insist on detailed findings by dis-
trict judges. The Fifth Circuit-the court that was reversed in the
Pullman-Standard decision-in fact exacts a high level of detail. In one of
its leading statements, the court has observed that when intentional dis-
crimination is the issue, a trial court that believes the employer's expla-
nation of intent cannot merely state that the plaintiff has failed to prove a
pretext, or that there was no evidence of discrimination. Instead, the
court "must at least refer to the evidence tending to prove and disprove
the merits of the proffered explanation and state why the court reached
19881 RULE 52
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the conclusion that the explanation has not been discredited. ' 7 2 An even
more demanding approach is reflected in a Fourth Circuit opinion.73
Similar approaches can be found in other cases dealing with a variety of
other discrimination problems. 74
Insistence on detailed fact findings may help to transfer substantial
portions of the responsibility for law application to courts of appeals,
even under the clear error banner. The requirement of detailed findings,
however, does not of itself respond to the risk that findings may be delib-
erately slanted to justify the result actually reached on more intuitive
grounds. 75 In rare cases, the process of adjusting findings to the result
may be so open as to justify correction on that ground.76 In other cases,
searching review is apt to be the only protection.
72 Ratliffv. Governor's Highway Safety Program, 791 F.2d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 1986). This opin-
ion has frequently been cited in later opinions, e.g., Lopez v. Current Director Tex. Econ. Dev.
Comm'n., 807 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1987).
73 See Warren v. Halstead Indus. Inc., 802 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1986).
74 In Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. School Dist., 804 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1986), involving a chal-
lenge to an at-large election system as abridging the right to vote on account of race, the court ruled
that district courts are required to explain with particularity the reasoning and subsidiary factual
conclusions underlying their reasoning. The court must discuss not only the evidence supporting its
decision but also the substantial evidence contrary to the decision. Such detailed findings must be
made with respect to at least the following issues: whether the minority group is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district (Id at 472); whether
there is racially polarized voting (Id. at 473); whether there is a history of discrimination against the
minority group (Id. at 474), here American Indians; what is the effect of present social and economic
disparities between American Indians and Whites (Id.); whether there are voting practices that are
used to enhance the opportunity for discrimination (Id at 475); what factors account for electoral
successes and failures of minority group members (Id at 476); whether the elected body-a school
district-has been responsive to the needs of the minority. Id. at 477.
A finding that a commitment to fully integrate a state prison system was contained in the de-
fendant's plan to remedy existing problems was not sufficient. There must be more detail. Battle v.
Anderson, 788 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1986).
75 The fear that findings may be shaded to support the desired result has been expressed in
many ways. Professor Blume noted that barely a year after adoption of the First Judiciary Act provi-
sions limiting review of the facts found in equity and admiralty proceedings, Attorney General Ran-
dolph urged that review should be restored, saying: "Perhaps, therefore, the original law is
exceptionable in allowing the judge whose opinion is to be canvassed the privilege of placing the
cause in any attitude which squares best with that opinion." Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Juyy Cases,
20J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 68, 68 (1936).
Dean Carrington has expressed the danger in more modern langauge: "[Tlhe general princi-
ples.., and policies ... could be quickly subverted by hostile findings. By taking a discolored view
of the facts in every case in which a principle is invoked, the trier of fact could frustrate its applica-
tion." Carrington, supra note 47, at 519.
Reviewing courts tend to be more gentle in their suggestions. In Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), for example, the Court observed that a trial judge may not "insulate his
findings from review by denominating them credibility determinations ..... I.d at 575.
76 A fine illustration is provided by Barber v. United States, 711 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1983). The
trial judge initially concluded that the negligence of a private airplane pilot was equal to the negli-
gence of the air traffic controllers, and that Oregon Law-applicable through the Federal Tort
Claims Act-denied recovery. After appeal was taken, he filed amended findings that the pilot's
negligence was greater than that of the air traffic controllers. The amended findings were explained
on the ground that the judge had first decided that the pilot should not recover, and then found that
the negligence was equal because of the understanding that Oregon law would deny recovery. Upon
discovering that Oregon law bars recovery only if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of the
defendant, the findings were amended "to bring the result into conformity with what I thought the
result should be." Id at 130. The court of appeals remanded for new findings, suggesting that
perhaps the trial judge might wish to find that the circumstances warranted assignment to a different
judge. Id. at 131.
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Four more cases may help fill out the general picture of law applica-
tion review. The first, Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories,77 again in-
volved a legal test framed in terms of intent. Ives had a patent on the
drug cyclandelate and sold it under the CYCLOSPASMOL trademark.
After the patent expired, Inwood and others produced generic
equivalent drugs packaged in capsules of the same colors as the Ives cap-
sules. The generic drugs were marketed to pharmacists by catalogues
that at times contained explicit price comparisons to CYCLOSPASMOL
and pointed out the similarity of the capsules. Some retail pharmacists
sold generic cyclandelate in prescription bottles labeled as containing
CYCLOSPASMOL. Suit was brought against the generic manufacturers
for inducing trademark infringement. The district court found there was
no liability,78 the court of appeals reversed,79 and the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals because the district court findings were not
clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court stated that the question was
whether the generic manufacturers "intentionally induced the pharma-
cists to mislabel generic drugs."80 It ruled that liability could not rest on
showing that illegal substitution could be reasonably anticipated. It also
approved, however, the formulation used by the court of appeals on an
interlocutory appeal in the same case-liability could be found if the ge-
neric manufacturers "suggested, even by implication,"8 1 that the generic
drugs be sold in trademarked bottles. The district court found that the
catalogue comparisons of price and capsule color did not amount to an
implicit suggestion of substitution, relying in part on the relatively small
number of instances of trademark infringement by pharmacists and an
alternative explanation for the infringement in the ambiguities of state
labeling requirements.8 2 Wrapping these various elements together, it is
difficult to characterize the issue raised by the test of contributory in-
fringement as an issue of fact. The task of finding an implied suggestion
of substitution in the catalogues surely is one of determining whether the
catalogues went too far in describing the opportunity for illicit behavior.
The task seems more one of evaluation than fact inference. At the very
least, the line between fact inference and law application is obscure.
Since the catalogue materials are available for independent review in the
court of appeals, the task is simple, and the precise nature of the contrib-
utory infringement test murky, the clear error standard can properly per-
mit more searching review than is provided other issues of law
application.
77 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
78 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug. Co., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 638
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844
(1982).
79 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.1981), rev'd sub nom.
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
80 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 855.
81 Id at 851.
82 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) rev'd,
638 F.2d 538 (2d. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844
(1982).
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The next case is Baumgartner v. United States,85 in which the trial court
revoked Baumgartner's naturalization decree on finding fraud by the re-
quired clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof. The evidence essen-
tially showed that Baumgartner had said some kind things about Nazi
Germany and some unkind things about democracy, free speech, and
other of our cherished values. The Supreme Court reversed, despite the
two court rule, writing at length to show that the findings below were not
the kind of "fact" that precludes consideration by this Court.... Par-
ticularly is this so where a decision here for review cannot escape
broadly social judgments-judgments lying close to opinion regarding
the whole nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of
citizenship.84
The sweeping review practiced in Baumgartner was explained in part
on the basis of the same policies as require clear proof. Those policies
surely are reflected in the Court's emphasis on the need for review of
matters of broad social judgment. As compared to many issues of law
application, the Court was surely right to take a close look.
The third case is Panduit Corporation v. Dennison Manufacturing Co. 8 5
The district court held the patent in suit invalid on the ground that the
invention was obvious to a person skilled in the art. The Federal Circuit
reversed, without mentioning the clearly erroneous rule.8 6 The Supreme
Court remanded to the Federal Circuit for a statement of its "informed
opinion on the complex issue of the degree to which the obviousness
determination is one of fact."' 7 On remand, the Federal Circuit ruled
that a determination of obviousness is a matter of law, reviewable with-
out deference to Rule 52(a). Perhaps the most important part of its opin-
ion for present purposes was the observation that treating the question
as one of law would "facilitate a consistent application of the patent stat-
ute in the courts and in the Patent and Trademark Office." 8 8 A major
purpose of conferring jurisdiction of appeals in patent cases on the Fed-
eral Circuit was to reduce the wide variations in patent law that had
emerged from review by the regional circuits.8 9 Taking account of the
desire to achieve national uniformity in determining the scope of review
seems entirely appropriate.
The final case seems to look the other way. Thornburg v. Gingles90
involved the question whether multi-member legislative districts violated
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The finding that the districts diluted
black citizens' votes was treated as a question of fact, reviewed only for
clear error. The Court emphasized that the determination involves ap-
plication of the legal standard to the facts of each case in an intensely
83 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
84 Id at 671.
85 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2187 (1987).
86 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
87 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
88 810 F.2d at 1567.
89 The role of the Federal Circuit is described in 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3903 (Supp. 1988), and 17 Id. at § 4104 (2d ed. 1988).
90 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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individualized way, and that use of the clearly erroneous standard "pre-
serves the benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the indige-
nous political reality without endangering the rule of law." 91 This
statement seems to identify a problem of law application that should be
subject to less rigorous review than many others, apparently because dis-
trict courts-even three-judge district courts-cannot be expected to ar-
ticulate their familiarity with indigenous political reality in ways that
would support more searching appellate review.
These grand examples from the Supreme Court may be supple-
mented by one problem, more mundane, but common. The measure-
ment of damages for personal injury, dignitary offense, or the like, is an
exceedingly elusive task. Appellate review may well be limited to an ef-
fort to maintain some very loose semblance of uniformity between cases,
and to guard against an occasional act of outrageous excess or stinginess.
Thus, in reducing to $1,000,000 a $2,000,000 award for pain and
anguish to a child born disabled because of malpractice at an Army medi-
cal center, the Ninth Circuit observed that an award for intangible injury
should be reviewed primarily to maintain some degree of uniformity be-
tween cases, and concluded that the award "shocks our sense of sound
judgment. ' 92 The Seventh Circuit, affirming an award of $25,000 for
nonpecuniary harm caused by racial harassment by the plaintiff's co-
workers, stated that an appellate court is no better able to review ajudge
finding of intangible damages than a jury finding, and that the clearly
erroneous standard of review merges with an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.9 3 Such damages determinations do involve a law application task,
the use of vague standards of fair compensation to measure incredibly
elusive facts. The determination that appellate review should be very
narrow provides one last illustration of the variability of the standard of
review.
One final question remains. If I am right in asserting that many dif-
ferent standards of review properly pass under the clear error phrase,
and that much of the variability depends on the nature of the legal rules
involved in matters of law application, it is useful to consider the Erie
question. When a federal court applies state law, should the standard of
review be adjusted to reflect the standard applied in state courts? The
formal answer is virtually certain. Civil Rule 52(a) is valid, and therefore
controls.94 To the extent that the standard of review reflects the institu-
tional realities of federal judges, federal docket pressures, and federal
procedure, there are strong reasons for adhering to the federal standard.
The institutional realities and aspirations that shape the relations be-
tween state trial courts and courts of appeals may often be different, and
account for general differences in standards of review. Yet if the federal
standard itself varies according to differences in the need for appellate
supervision of different rules of law, surely it is appropriate to be as flexi-
91 Id. at 79.
92 Trevino v. United States, 804 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1986).
93 Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1424-1425 (7th Cir. 1986).
94 See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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ble for state law as for federal law. If state courts believe that a particular
area of state law demands greater appellate supervision because the rules
are difficult to communicate by abstract formulation, or because of a
need for uniformity, predictability, or reliability, federal courts should be
free to take that judgment into account in developing their own standard
of review.
V. Conclusion
Rule 52(a) has been successful because the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review does not establish a single test. Appellate courts have
been left free to adapt the measure of review to the shifting needs of
different cases, different laws, and different times. This success reflects
the rulemaking process at its best. A general tone is set, no attempt is
made to anticipate and meet the exigencies of countless multitudes of
cases, and practice develops along lines that are not often articulated but
are often wise. Rule 52(a), at least, should be as strong when our succes-
sors celebrate its centenary as it is now while we celebrate its golden
anniversary.
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